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RULE 10b-5: THE RECODIFICATION
THICKET
WLLuAm

H.

PAINTER*

A few years ago there appeared an article on a somewhat esoteric
aspect of federal income taxation partially entitled "Draining the
Serbonian Bog."' The title impressed me as being singularly apposite
not only to a backwater of the Internal Revenue Code but to that fascinating morass of federal common law2 which has grown up under that
benevolent umbrella with the innocuous title of rule lOb-5.3 The rule
needs no introduction; it is now part of the very air that corporation
lawyers must breathe daily. Despite its seeming simplicity, thousands
4
of words have been written in an attempt to explain its true meaning
It has been compared to a "dark horse, of dubious pedigree but very
fleet of foot" 5 and to an "unfolding chrysalis," 6 but such metaphors,
as Cardozo once said, are suspect and should be "narrowly watched"
lest they end by enslaving our thoughts. 7 Fortunately, much of the
judicial development which has been taking place in the lOb-5 area has
been cautious and exploratory in what might be described as the best
common-law tradition." With few exceptions, most of the opinions
reflect judicial awareness of the importance of maintaining a balance
between the legitimate roles of the federal and state courts in resolving
disputes in the corporate area, recognizing the necessity of establishing
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City, School of Law. A.B., Princeton
University, 1950; J.D., Harvard University, 1954.
1 Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations
under the 1954 Code, 81 HARv. L. Rxv. 1194 (1968). For a description see J. MILToN,
PARAD SE Losr Book II, lines 592-94:
A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog
Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old,
Where armies whole have sunk ....
2 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie -And of the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoa
or N.Y.C.BA. 64 (1964).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
4 For a partial bibliography see A. BROmBERG, SEcurrMEs LAw: FRAu) - SEC RuLE
10B-5 app. H (1967).
5Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders" in the
United States, 33 MOD. L. Rxv. 34, 40 (1970).
6 W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INsIDER TRADING viii (1968) [hereinafter W.
PAINTE].

7 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
8 See Loss, supra note 5, at 51, quoting P. DEVLN, SAMPLES OF LAW-MAKING 10 (1962):
It is not in accordance with traditional methods of judicial law-making to begin
by saying how far you will go. Some cases are allowed and then others are disallowed as going too far, and the formulation of principles has to wait until
that process is well advanced; and during the process the common lawyer will
stop, logic or no logic, when something tells him that he has gone far enough.
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some workable parameters to the lOb-5 expansion process, lest the rule,
which says very little in itself, be so interpreted as to swallow up the
whole field of shareholder litigation.
If it be assumed that the rule should have parameters, the controversial issues may be not only the question of where those parameters
should be, i.e., whether the scope of the rule should be relatively
broad or narrow, but also the question of who is to set them, i.e.,
whether the contours of the law in this area are best set by statutory
reform, further rule-making on the administrative level, or whether we
should be content with the present approach, which can only be described as judicial development on a more or less ad hoc basis, aided
by the pragmatic effect of precedent as it reflects the wisdom which
comes from experience.
Before discussing the possible parameters, let us then turn briefly
to the question of how those parameters should be established.
CODIFICATION,

RULE-MAKING

OR JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT

If there be a resolution to this question, it may primarily depend
upon the extent to which a particular branch of the government, i.e.,
Congress, the SEC or the courts, can realistically be expected to exert
itself to clarify the law, and the degree to which it is able to do so in an
informed and dispassionate manner. To be sure, each approach has
its potential difficulties. Despite whatever may be said about congressional intent, it seems fairly clear that the contours of legislation in
the securities field, as well as many other less esoteric areas, are primarily set in committee meetings. Although I do not have a wealth of
experience along these lines, I suspect that a bill, if it is not to be stillborn, must have the enthusiastic support of the committee chairman
and such other committee members as may be expected to have the
expertise to understand the bill and its implications, as well as sufficient
interest to attend the hearings which must be held before the bill makes
its debut on the floor of either house. 9 Perhaps of equal importance,
however, is the influence of respected interested parties or groups.
In the securities area, although one might hope that this would include
law professors, realism dictates that primary recognition be given to
the roles of the various stock exchanges, the NASD and, above all, the
9 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (dealing with the Williams Bill, which
provides for disclosure in cash tender offers and certain open market acquisitions of
shares). The hearings lasted three days. Of the nine-member subcommittee only five
senators attended any of the three meetings. Although Senator Williams, the subcommittee
chairman, attended all three, no other senator attended more than one meeting except
for Senator Bennett, who attended two meetings.
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SEC.10 Indeed, without the latter's imprimatur, if not enthusiastic
endorsement, the chances are slim that a piece of securities legislation
will ever see the light of day. Thus, at the risk of some oversimplification, we might think of the congressional process as having as its principal focus the meetings and hearings of the appropriate committees,
aided and abetted, as it were, by the SEC and other interested parties.
This means that the major policy decisions and much of the drafting
may take place outside of Congress and that general understandings, although not of course guarantees of passage, may be informally achieved
even before a bill is submitted.
If this be so, then why legislate? Could not the same overall objectives be sustained by administrative rule-making, where interested
parties are invited to express their views on proposed regulations which
are given the requisite publicity under the safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act?" To some extent this may be true, and yet there
are obviously things which Congress may do that an administrative
agency such as the SEC cannot do. Without exploring the matter too
deeply, it may suffice to say that the SEC cannot create civil liabilities
or criminal sanctions which are not provided for in a statute. There is
also considerable doubt about the SEC's power to negate or extend
implied private rights, 1 2 aside from exercising a legislatively delegated
power to articulate a preexistent legislative intent or, in the context
of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, to define further the meaning
of the phrase "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."'1 3 Beyond this, it may of course exercise its prerogative to bring enforce14
ment proceedings, such as the recent SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
affair or file briefs amicus curiae in private proceedings in an attempt
to elucidate for the court the proper meaning of the statute or its own
rules.'

5

Finally, there are some things which a court can do which neither
10 Id. Three law professors and a practicing attorney were invited to testify en masse
and were given approximately thirty minutes for a panel-type presentation. Many of the
fundamental issues, as well as some more technical suggestions, raised by the witnesses
appeared to have received short shrift from the subcommittee. See 6 L. Loss, SEcuarrIEs
REGULATION 3664-65 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter Loss]. The testimony of representatives of the various stock exchanges and the SEC appeared to have made a greater
impression.
115 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1964).
12 See Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action
Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence
for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. Ras. L. Rav. 925 (1966).
13 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
14 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
15 See Shipley, The SEC's Amicus Curiae Aid to Plaintiffs in Mutual Fund Litigation,
52 A.B.A.J. 337 (1966) (criticizing the SEC for excessive use of the privilege).
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an administrative agency nor Congress can do, at least with any measure of success. By and large these consist of settling disputes between
private parties concerning their rights and liabilities in given fact
situations and, to that extent, deciding what the law is as applied to
a particular case. Without getting into jurisprudential niceties concerning whether judges can or do legislate, it may be enough to say that
judges do play a vital role, to fill in statutory interstices and to interpret
the meaning of statutes or rules in accordance with how they view the
purpose or function of those statutes or rules. As far as section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act or rule lob-5 is concerned, this has turned out
in practice to involve no inconsiderable amount of judicial creativity,
whether viewed as mere extrapolation of the original intent of Con16 See Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970), dealing with the standing of a corporation making a
tender offer to sue management of the target corporation for alleged violations of rule
lOb-5. In denying standing, the court stated that it refused to overrule Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), observing:
The Birnbaum rule recognizes the policy of Congress in enacting Section 10(b)
and of the Commission in adopting Rule lOb-5, namely, the protection of defrauded purchasers and sellers. It is not the province of the courts to extend
Section 10(b) to apply to transactions not intended to be covered by Congress.
We do well to heed the words of Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in a
case about another section of the 1934 Act, Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413
(1962) ....
"Congress can and might amend [the Act] if the Commission would
present to it the policy arguments it has -presented to us, but we think
that Congress is the proper agency to change an interpretation of the Act
unbroken since its passage, if the change is to be made."
That the conduct averred in any given case may be reprehensible does not mean
that a federal remedy must be furnished by judges.
Whether the above accurately characterizes the prevailing attitude of the judiciary
towards rule 1Ob-5 is best left for the reader to determine. It should suffice to say that
there is a respectable difference of opinion on the matter even among the judges of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d
453, 464 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (Moore, J., dissenting); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 870 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also Address of Mr.
Justice Harlan before the Federal Bar Association, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1967,
at 4, col. 1:
[There is an] increasing tendency to look to the federal courts to set right things
which, under our governmental system, should be left for solution elsewhere. This
tendency is, of course, a phenomenon of the spirit for change generated by the
great social, political and economic upheavals that have followed in the wake of
the two world wars. At bottom, it evinces impatience with the slowness of reform
when sought through the political process and, what to many is more disturbing,
skepticism as to whether our historic federal system is any longer adequate to meet
the problems confronting moder American society . ... To many this use of
the federal judicial process is disquieting, for reasons that cut much deeper than
They wonder
mere disagreement with particular controversial decisions ....
whether the current fast pace of constitutional change being effected through the
medium of the judiciary is not making lasting inroads into the two great princidividing lines between federal
ples that underlie our system of government -the
and state authority, and, within the federal system, the separation of governmental
powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
Although the above is directed primarily to judicial developments in constitutional controversies, it has been thought apposite to the lOb-5 area. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp.
60, 70 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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gress 16 or judicial activism of a more pronounced sort.'7 Whatever one's
philosophy concerning the desirability of judges making as well as
interpreting law, it seems fairly obvious that, since neither statutes nor
8
rules can possibly provide for all possible contingencies, courts must
inevitably play a vital role in dealing with the new and unexpected.
In doing so, they can hardly be passive in the sense of blindly applying
black letter law to grind out results which are correct only because they
supposedly reflect congressional or administrative intent. In reality
the intent is only sparsely evident if evident at all.19 Hence judges
must interpolate, extrapolate or even innovate since they must, above
all, decide the case at hand one way or another and give plausible
reasons for the results they reach.
This points up both the merits and the deficiencies of the case-bycase approach to problems of securities law. The greatest value, perhaps, is its flexibility and resiliency. Congress was well aware that fraud
may come in an infinite variety of forms. Consequently, it made the
wise policy decision of not attempting to define fraud with any degree
of exclusivity, leaving that task to the Commission and, at least by implication, also to the courts.2 0 The Commission responded only in the
most general terms by its promulgation of rule lOb-5, again presumably
making a determination that the proper meaning of "device, scheme or
artifice to defraud" could only be determined ad hoc, i.e., case-by-case.
The courts have, by and large, adopted the same approach, although
they have attempted, from time to time, to set a few parameters to the

permissible scope of the rule. 21
17 See, e.g., the remarks of Afr. Milton Freeman, one of the draftsmen of rule lOb-5,
on its subsequent development, in Conference on Codification of Federal Securities Laws,
22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967):
Louis [Loss] is absolutely right that I never thought that twenty-odd years later it
[rule lOb-5] would be the biggest thing that had ever happened. It was intended
to give the Commission power to deal with ... [fraudulent purchases of shares].
It had no relation in the Commission's contemplation to private proceedings.
How it got into private proceedings was by the ingenuity of members of the private bar starting with the Kardon case [Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.
Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947)]. It has been developed by the private lawyers, the
members of the Bar with the assistance or, if you don't like it, connivance of the
federal judiciary, who thought this was a very fine fundamental idea and that it
should be extended.
18 See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), wherein Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran, one of the draftsmen of the
Exchange Act, described the function of section 10(b) as being in the nature of a catchall
clause which says, in effect, "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices."
19 See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 627 (1963) (perhaps the best investigation of the legislative history
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
20 See note 18 supra.
21 Perhaps the most successful parameter has been the Birnbaum rule, restricting civil
actions for damages to those who have either purchased or sold securities, with the terms
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A conspicuous defect of the judicial approach is its retroactivity
and, to some extent, its lack of predictability. Judges commonly deal
with situations which have already transpired or violations of the law
which have allegedly taken place at some time in the past, although
this is by no means always the case.22 Their decisions must, again with
few exceptions, 2 3 be retroactive in effect. This is also true with administrative enforcement proceedings,2 4 and yet the Commission has power
to promulgate rules and regulations to clarify its interpretation of the
law for future guidance. If enforcement proceedings are brought at
the judicial level, such as an action for injunctive or other relief, then
a court is free to adjust the remedy it gives to suit the exigencies of the
particular situation. Thus, a court may decide not to grant injunctive
relief or impose a similarly severe penalty if it believes that the
various parties acted in good faith and in ignorance of what the law
25
was if the case happens to be one of first impression.
From the foregoing discussion it should be apparent that a useful
approach to the problem of clarifying the lOb-5 area would be to avoid
a simplistic assumption that the job would best be performed only by
Congress, only by the SEC or only by the courts. For one thing, the
problem is too complex for such easy solutions. For another, any
acceptable solution is likely to emerge only from the fullest possible
use of the advantages of all three approaches - legislation, rule-making
and judicial interpretation. Thus, to the extent that the area can and
should be codified, new legislation is desirable; to the extent that such
codification should be supplemented by administrative interpretations
in the form of rules, guidelines 26 or rulings, both of a formal and informal nature, this too should be done; and, finally, to the extent that
purchase and sale being defined in a relatively broad sense. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). See generally W. PAINTER 278-98;
notes 92-106 and accompanying text infra. Less successful attempts have been the requirements of privity, reliance and scienter, all of which have at one time or another, been
discredited as necessary ingredients to a 10b-5 action. See W. PAINTER 103-18 (privity and
reliance), 154-65, 229-36 (scienter).
22 Declaratory judgments may be a good example of the exceptional case.
23 E.g., the practice of prospective overruling of prior decisions. For a collection of
the authorities, see Rogers, Perspectives on Prospective Overruling, 86 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rlv.
35, 36 n.5 (1967).
24 See, e.g., In re Investors Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
77,832 (June 26, 1970); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
SEC. L. REP.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
25 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where
the district court, in the proceeding on remand in the Texas Gulf case, decided not to
grant injunctive relief against all but two of the individual defendants since the decision
by the Court of Appeals represented "a considerable extension of the meaning of 'materiality' into new areas" and also because the court did not think that there was a reasonable likelihood of further violations. Id. at 90.
26 See W. PAINTER 395 n.20.
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the area cannot or should not be dosed in by a more or less rigid
statutory or regulatory format, it should be left for judicial interpretation and development in the common-law tradition.
The problem then becomes one of determining which areas should
be handled legislatively, which administratively and which should be
left for the courts. Here, there is no easy solution, although a few things
should be readily apparent. As already mentioned, certain reforms
can be made only through legislation. One of the best examples of this
might be the need to reconcile the statutes of limitations of the various
provisions expressly imposing civil liability with the lOb-5 area, where
the traditional rule has been that the courts are to follow the state
statute of limitations prevailing in the forum for a similar action if it
had been brought in the state courts, 27 although the federal courts are
free to apply the equitable doctrine of laches in appropriate cases.2, It

seems to be well recognized that this aspect of rule lOb-5 has been particularly effective in subverting the more articulated scheme set forth in
the Securities Act of 193329 with the undesirable result of permitting
actions to be brought under rule 1Ob-5 when they would clearly be
barred under the 1933 Act. Several approaches to the problem are possible. One of the best might be a by-product of the project now being conducted under the auspices of the American Law Institute to recodify
the entire pattern of securities laws, and hopefully bring the statutory
scheme under a single roof.30 This suggests that a single antifraud pro-

vision might be desirable, to cover the areas now dealt with in sections
11, 12(2) and 17 of the 1933 Act 31 and sections 10(b), 15(c)(1), 18 and
29(b) of the 1934 Act.32 If this is done, then such a provision could
have a statute of limitations which would apply to all actions based on
fraud or negligent misstatements, although the period within which
various types of actions could be brought might differ with the circumstances, e.g., a longer period of limitation could be prescribed for
actions based on wilful misrepresentation; a shorter one for actions
based on simple negligence.
Similar distinctions might also be made as to when the statute
of limitations should commence to run, e.g., wilful suppression of the
facts might justify an indefinite tolling of the statute or at least a rela27 See 8 Loss 1771.
28 Id. 1772.
29 See id.1778; 6 Loss 8907.
30 See Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus.
LAw. 27 (1969).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) & 77q (1964).
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c)(1), 78r & 78cc(b) (1964).
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tively long maximum period within which actions might be brought.
This would also provide an opportunity to iron out or at least justify
other differences, some slight and others not so slight 83 now existing
in the statutory pattern.
Aside from procedural problems such as statutes of limitations,
jurisdiction and venue,3 4 the most baffling problems are likely to arise
in various substantive areas and generally will involve the question
of how wide the scope of federal regulation in the corporate area should
be. In the context of the current statutory and regulatory pattern, the
question has been one of setting parameters to the expansion of rule
lOb-5, but recodification or reform of the regulatory framework might
well extend beyond this to deal with the fundamental problem of
which types of regulation and civil sanctions should be imposed federally and which areas should be left for regulation by the states. Using
the experience under rule 1Ob-5 as a point of departure, we might consider at least three important areas: (1) insider trading, (2) liability for
false or misleading press releases and other related prolems of disclosure, and (3) liability for breaches of fiduciary duty. The list is
probably not exhaustive but it is likely to include most of the significant problems which are now arising in the lob-5 area.
33 For example, section 9(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964), restricts
actions to one year after discovery of the "facts constituting the violation" and three years
"after such violation"; section 18(c) speaks of "one year after the discovery of the facts
constituting the cause of action" and three years "after such cause of action accrued." 15
U.S.C. § 78r (1964). Cf. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964), which refers
to "one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence." Query: whether
the differences in language were intended by the draftsmen and whether they are more
than distinctions without a difference? Similar variations exist in the antifraud language
of the various provisions. For example, is there any appreciable difference between the
meaning of "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in section 10(b) and "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" in section 14(e) of the Exchange Act?
15 US.C. §§ 78j, 78n(e) (1964, Supp. V, 1970). See also §§ 15(c)(1) & 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o
& 78r(a) (1964). Are any of these different from rule lOb-5, which speaks of a "device,
scheme or artifice to defraud" or "any act, practice or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security"? At one point in the hearings on the Williams Bill, it was suggested
that this matter should be clarified or at least that Congress should not compound the
confusion by adding still further variations in language to the statute, but the suggestion
was apparently thought unimportant or academic. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 140-41
(statement of Professor Painter).
34 Section 22(a) of the 1939 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964), gives the federal courts concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts over civil suits based on violations of the Act.
Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964), gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits based on Exchange Act violations. In order to promote uniformity, it
would seem desirable to give the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all antifraud
type actions, regardless of whether they are based on the sale of securities, e.g., sections
12(2) and 17 of the Securities Act, or the purchase or sale of securities, e.g., section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act.
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INSIDER TRADING

Although there is at least one state statute which attempts to
deal with this problem, most of the development in this area has taken
place in the federal courts under rule lOb-5 or under the considerably
narrower provisions of section 16 of the Exchange Act.35 Despite the
fact that most states could be expected to follow the statutory, regulatory and case-law development which has been taking place on the
federal level if they choose to handle this problem, it seems desirable, as
already suggested, to continue the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts to deal with insider trading to the extent that it constitutes a
violation of federal law. In certain respects, such as insider trading in
securities of companies whose shares are listed on a national securities
exchange or companies whose shares are dealt in over-the-counter but
who fall within the reporting provisions of the Exchange Act, because
their assets exceed $1,000,000 and they are issuers of a class of equity
security held of record by 500 or more persons, 36 it might be well to
consider whether the federal law should make an attempt to preempt
the field so that individual actions or class suits based on insider trading
could not be brought on the state level even if authorized by state
statutes. The question of preemption may resolve itself into more of a
political issue than a legal one and yet, from a strictly legal standpoint,
it seems advisable to avoid multiplicity of litigation and excessive
forum shopping by restricting insider suits to the federal courts if they
relate to companies whose shares are relatively widely held. The existing federal regulation of trading on the exchanges and over-the-counter
as well as the obvious effect of such insider trading on interstate commerce in securities would seem to satisfy any constitutional qualms one
might have about the constitutionality of preemption in this area.
Other forms of insider trading, i.e., in shares of companies which are
closely held or whose securities are not widely traded, would be left
for regulation by the states, although that would not prevent the same
area from being regulated by the federal law as well. As previously indicated, the federal courts might be given exclusive jurisdiction of all
35 See CAL. CoRPs. CODE § 25402 (West 1968). As a result of some prodding by the
1964 securities acts amendments, which extended the provisions of section 16 of the 1934
Act to include insurance companies unless trading in the securities of such companies
was regulated by the states "substantially in the manner provided in section 16," all the
states have adopted versions of the short-swing liability and reporting provisions prevailing on the federal level. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12(g)(2)(G)(iii) 15
U.S.C. §§ 781(g)(2)(iii), (1964). The state provisions, however, are applicable only to
insurance companies. For a collection of the various provisions, see 2 CCH Fa. SEc.
L. REP.
23,310.05, at 17,138 (1969). For background discussion, see IV. CARY, PoLxmcs
AND THE R EGuATORY AGENcIES 112-17 (1967).
36 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1964).
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actions based on antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
although, except for the preempted area of listed or widely traded overthe-counter securities, this would not prevent state courts from entertaining actions based on violations of state law.
Turning now to what may be the primary problem in this area,
how are we to define insider trading and what should be its consequences? This resolves itself into several component problems, i.e., the
definition of the term insider, the definition of inside information or
materiality and the problem of whether there should be civil liability,
criminal liability or administrative sanctions of one form or another
for various types of insider trading. The civil liability area in turn
suggests the question of liability to whom? To supposedly injured
parties, either individually or by class actions? To the company whose
shares are being traded? To some other interested person, such as the
SEC?
The Definition of Insider
To begin with, it can be safely assumed that the term insider
should extend at least to directors, officers, major shareholders, i.e.,
those owning more than 10 percent of the outstanding shares, and to
the issuer itself as well as to subsidiaries under its control.37 Anyone in
control of the issuer should likewise be termed an insider.38 Beyond this
area the situation becomes unclear. Essentially the problem resolves
itself into the extent to which so-called tippees should be subject to the
same duties as those imposed on insiders of the more conventional
variety. The strictest approach has been to declare that anyone in possession of undisclosed confidential information is subject to the same
duties as any other insider regardless of the manner in which he acquired the information provided only that he knows or should know
that the information has not been disclosed to the investing public.8 9
A more lenient approach is the access test, i.e., whether the person in
question has a relationship to the company which amounts to "access,
37 See rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1970) for a useful definition of control: "Possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract,
or otherwise." For further discussion, see Sommer, Who's "in Control?"- S.E.C., 21 Bus.
LAW. 559 (1966).
38 Id.; cf. Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
39 Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Investors
77,832 (June 26,
Management Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP.
1970); see also Sandier 8: Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 Ojzo ST. L.J. 225, 239 (1969).
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directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.... -40

To illustrate the difference, suppose that a person having no relationship with a company either through share ownership or as an employee
or independent contractor (such as accountant, attorney or management consultant) overhears a conversation in which sharply higher projected earnings are mentioned. Suppose, in addition, that this inadvertent tippee does not know the identity of the parties to the
conversation he overhears but he assumes that the information may be
accurate because the parties speak with an air of authority. May he use
the information in his trading activities if he is willing to take the risk
that the information may prove to be unreliable? Since he has no access
to the company or to an insider, does his mere possession of inside
information impose a duty not to trade? It is sometimes said that the
stock market thrives on tips. If someone is willing to rely on a rumor
should he be penalized if the rumor proves to be correct? To extend
the prohibition against insider trading to such limits would pose a
serious threat to the credibility of the rule for the very simple reason
that it would at best be only selectively enforceable. Thus, despite the
simplicity of the possession test, it would be better if something akin
to "possession plus" were required, i.e., possession plus knowledge,
actual or constructive, of company source, or knowledge that the information comes from someone in an "access" relationship to a company
source, such as an officer, director, other employee, or consultant, including attorney, accountant, management consultant, investment advisor, underwriter or securities analyst. Under such a "possession plus"
approach individuals falling within the foregoing categories, i.e., those
with access, and their tippees would be covered by the prohibition
against insider trading. The same would apply to "second-level" tippees if they have knowledge of the origin of the information, i.e., if
they have "possession plus." This seems to be the widest reach which
the rule should be given as a practical matter. For the most part, insider
trading cases will probably continue as before to involve primarily
people falling within the narrower access category, i.e., officers, directors, employees and other persons having a relationship with the company.
40 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). The Texas Gulf case endorses

the access approach and refers to Cady with approval and yet supplements this by the
possession test. Since the latter is broader in scope this seems to make the access test

redundant.
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What Is Inside Information?
The resolution of this question depends upon the test which is
applied to determine materiality. If facts are not material, then there
is no duty to disclose before trading. As with the problem of determining who is an insider, there are several possible definitions of inside
information. The two principal approaches to the question have been
the reasonable investor test and the substantial market effect test. The
former concerns itself with information which would be relevant to a
hypothetical reasonable investor in making a decision to purchase, sell
or hold securities. The latter concerns itself with the hypothetical effect
which the public disclosure of the information might have on the market price of the company's securities. At first glance, the two tests do not
appear to differ widely or at least there is a considerable area of overlap. Thus, information which would be relevant to a reasonable investor would be likely on disclosure to have a substantial market effect
if we assume that the market price is determined by the net effect of
market decisions by a multitude of investors who are, for the most
part, acting fairly reasonably. Even though there may be other factors
at work, e.g., general economic conditions, international uncertainties,
and even though the precise effect of a particular news item may never
be completely predictable, either qualitatively or quantitatively, we
may yet assume that there is, more often than not, a general correspondence between what investors know (or think they know) and the way
in which the market behaves.
But when it comes to choosing between the reasonable -investor and
substantial market effect tests for the purpose of defining materiality,
there are some further difficulties. For example, if the reasonable investor test is chosen, how are we to define reasonability? The appellate
court in the Texas Gulf case defined this exceedingly broadly, stating
that "[t]he speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also
'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded
conservative traders."4' 1 If this is to be taken literally, the reasonable investor test becomes so broad as to be nearly unworkable. Rumors and
guesses, educated 42 or otherwise, motivate the speculator, as well as
what could only be described as the mood of the moment and crowd
psychology. To impose an affirmative duty to disclose all that might be
relevant to speculators, chartists and others would seem to condone if
41401 F.2d at 849.
42 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff1'd
in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub non.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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not encourage the type of premature release of unreliable or unripe
facts which it would be wiser to withhold. In all fairness, however, the
appellate court in Texas Gulf did go on to suggest that the test may
involve what was termed a balancing, i.e., "a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity."' 43 The balancing approach may help but then again it may but
further compound the confusion. Thus, we are told that we must have
the reasonable speculative investor in mind, that we must estimate
whether the news if disclosed might 44 have a substantial effect on the
market price of the company's securities and, finally, it is suggested that
we should balance the indicated probability that the event will occur
in the light of its anticipatedmagnitude when compared to the totality
of the company activity. All of this seems highly conceptual if not impossible for the average insider to use as any sort of a practical guideline. In the final analysis, it may come down to little more than saying
that materiality depends upon the facts of each case, retroactively
determined by the particular court in which you happen to be sued,
acting with the benefit of hindsight. Although it may be possible to
develop more workable tests, such as "Would this information prompt
me to risk my own funds?," 45 this seems an even less satisfactory and
highly subjective approach - something akin to "I may not know why
it's material, but at least I know it when I see it" or "You will know
it in your heart if you are violating the law."46
Considering all the possibilities, the most workable test may be
that which emphasizes substantial market effect. This at least avoids
the hypothetical and subjective problems of ascertaining what a reason43 401 F.2d at 849.
44 Id., citing List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
noa. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
45
See West, Timely Disclosure - The View from 11 Wall Street, 24 Sw. L.J. 241, 242
(1970).
46 See, e.g., the suggestion of former Commission Chairman Cohen:
A certain amount of uncertainty, of lack of rules, means that people have to continually examine their own positions and make their own decisions about whether
what they want to do is legal. If, in the insider area, that means that businessmen
decide not to buy in borderline cases, I have to think that's all to the good.
FORTUNE, Dec. 1966, at 219. Query: to what extent can good faith be made a primary
foundation for legal obligations? Cf. M. GLUCKFAN, THE IDEAs IN B.AROTSE JURISPRUDENCE
199, 201 (1965). There are also of course problems of administrative due process in this
approach. See Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEo. WASH. L.
R v.473 (1967). For discussions on the administrative obligation to provide specificity and
predicability in rules and regulations wherever possible, see K. DAvis, ADmiNisTRAAivF L Wv
§ 6.13 (Supp. 1965); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADINISTRATIE ACTION 49 (1965) &

Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. Ray. 863, 874 (1962).
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able investor might consider relevant under the circumstances. Nonetheless, the substantial market effect test itself involves problems of
prediction, i.e., how the market would be likely to behave if news were
disclosed. Even further uncertainties arise if the test is phrased in terms
of how the market might behave, as was the approach in the Texas Gulf
appellate opinion. Finally, who is to determine when a market effect
is substantial enough to justify a finding of materiality? The truth of
the matter may be that, no matter what the criterion for determining
materiality, the question is bound to involve several variables and its
resolution must depend upon value judgments about those variables,
i.e., what is substantial? What is the probability of market reaction?
But this does not mean that a workable test of materiality in terms of
market effect is of no utility. Inevitably there will be problems of
degree which can only be determined by a finder of fact. A suitable
formulation might be as follows: Information is material if its disclosure to the public would be reasonably likely to have a substantial
effect on the market price of the company's securities.
Some might argue that a materiality test should go beyond this
and consider evidence of the defendants' probable estimate of the importance of the information as possibly reflected in their trading activities. For example, the appellate court in the Texas Gulf decision
placed considerable stress on the timing and amount of the defendants'
purchases, including the purchase of short-term calls by those who, in
some instances, had never previously purchased calls on stock. This,
the court concluded, "virtually compels the inference that the insiders
were influenced by the drilling results.

47

The argument, sometimes

referred to as the "Cut Your Own Throat" test of materiality, 48 is
not without a certain appeal. Certainly, in an appropriate case such
as Texas Gulf, a court should be free to consider the pattern of trading
and draw its own conclusions. It might even be said that an unusual influx of buy or sell orders originating from insiders or their tippees
shortly before the public disclosure of important information might
present a prima facie case of a securities law violation, subject to rebuttal by a convincing showing by one or more defendants that his purchases were motivated by other factors. 49 On the other hand, the "Cut
Your Own Throat" approach should be restricted to situations such
as Texas Gulf where there has been an unusual trading pattern. One
47 401 F.2d at 851.
48 See A. BROMBERG, supra note 4, at § 7A(3)(h).
49 Many of the defendants in the Texas Gulf litigation introduced evidence that their
purchases were motivated by factors extrinsic to the ore discovery. See W. PAINTER 178-79.
The evidence was given little weight if not rejected by both the trial and appellate courts.
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should not generalize that any trading by an insider prior to public
disclosure of material information amounts to a violation, nor should
such trading even raise a presumption of illegality if it is relatively
modest in amount and is justified by good business or investment
reasons. This is another instance in which only the court which decides
the particular case can draw the line, i.e., between usual or permissible
trading and that which is unusual and therefore suspect.
Sanctions for Insider Trading
Assuming that someone is an insider and that he makes unlawful
use of inside information in his trading activities, or in tipping to
others who trade, what then? Should he be civilly liable? If so to whom
and for how much? Should he be held criminally responsible in some
way? Or should there be some form of administrative sanction, such
as an order to cease and desist or injunctive relief?
First, it may be wise to inquire why we wish to make insider
trading unlawful. Is it because insider trading harms others?, i.e.,
Do an insider's purchases in some way injure those who wish to
sell? 50 Or is it that insider trading lessens public confidence in the
50 See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MA.Er 61 (1966). For an earlier
analysis, see Whitney, Section 10b-5: From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAw. 193 (1965); see also Comment, SEC Enforcement of Rule 10b-5 Duty
to Disclose Material Information - Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MIcH.
353-55. After some
L. REv. 944, 960 (1967). For discussion of the point, see W. PAITrIf
painful soul searching, the author must express some doubts as to whether any harm in
a strict economic sense results from insider trading in the essentially faceless context of
exchange transactions or in an active over-the-counter market. Thus, there seems to be
some validity to the argument that an insider's purchasing tends to drive up the market
price and gives the seller a better price than he would have received if the insider had
not been purchasing (with the converse benefit going to the purchaser if the insider happens to be on the selling side of the market). Although it would obviously be better for
the non-insider to know what the insider knows, in which case he might not sell or buy
at all at the prevailing market price, this merely indicates the desirability of disclosing
material information as promptly as possible in order that the prevailing market price
may reflect the facts as accurately as possible. If this could be done with 100 percent
efficiency there would be no information gap between insiders and outsiders and hence
little opportunity for insider trading. Obviously, however, all the relevant information
cannot be publicly disclosed. See Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23
VAND. L. REV. 547, 569-75 (1970). Furthermore, it has been recognized by both the SEC
and the courts that a company may delay or withhold disclosure of material information
if it has a legitimate business reason for doing so. Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306
F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (no duty to disclose drilling results until the company had
completed its program of acquiring options on surrounding land). Thus, it is arguable
that since the investing public is not necessarily entitled to all the material facts at any
given moment, and since the insider's trading tends, if anything, to equalize the disparity
between the prevailing price and what the price would be if the information were disclosed, insider trading is, if anything, beneficial from an economic standpoint and certainly harms no one. Despite the cogency of the argument, it proceeds on a questionable
assumption that an activity should be permitted unless it results in positive economic
harm. Thus, it falls victim to the fallacy of focusing exclusively on economic effects and
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integrity of the securities markets?51 Or does it perhaps tarnish the
corporate image?52 The debate on matters such as these seems virtually
endless but the argument has a way of resolving into a general (by no
means universal) agreement that insider trading, whether or not it
actually harms others, should be discouraged. It is simply not right53
although we may not be precisely sure why this is so.
If we can safely assume that insider trading should be discouraged
even when it may not harm others, this may be a key to the approach
which should be taken to the matter of sanctions against insider trading. More precisely, the prohibition should take the form of a deterrent
and should only secondarily seek to compensate injured parties for
their losses. In open market transactions where shares are actively
and even heavily traded, and where, as on national securities exchanges,
the actual purchasers and sellers may be unknown to one another
(dealing through brokers including, in many instances, specialists or
overlooks other factors which are equally if not more important, i.e., prevailing public
distaste for insiders' exploiting their privileged position to achieve personal gains and the
widely held belief that executives or government officials who indulge in such activities
lack integrity and are unworthy of public trust. Added to this is the possibility that, if
insiders are permitted to exploit confidential information in the market place, disclosure
of material information might be delayed for other than legitimate business reasons to
enable the insiders to maximize their profits.
51 For a critique of this argument, see Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors,
supra note 50, at 577. Without agreeing with Professor Manne, who characterizes the argument as the "SEC's Confidence Game," presumably because it has been popular with some
SEC staff members, it might be better to state that insider trading lessens public confidence
in the insiders, if not in the securities markets. And if there is loss of public confidence in
the integrity of management, this is likely to lessen public enthusiasm for investing; in
that sense there is likely to be a loss of confidence in the securities markets. To pursue
the point further, if the investing public consisted exclusively of individuals who, like
Professor Manne, were preoccupied solely with economic effects and made their investment
decisions accordingly, public enthusiasm for investment would increase if it were widely
known that insider trading was exerting a beneficial economic effect. The problem with
this is that investors do not concern themselves exclusively with economic effects and are
motivated by a wide variety of factors, many of which can only be described as irrational.
Thus, a recent analyst, perhaps with tongue in cheek, has pointed out that stock market
behavior tends to be more irrational than the behavior of (1) a woman, or (2) an insane
woman, and can only be described as similar to the behavior of (3)a group of insane
women. See generally 'A. SmrrH,' TnE MONEY GAME 47-49 (1967). Without agreeing with
the latter analysis, it is still possible to surmise that many investors will be decidedly disenthused to learn of widespread insider trading, as in the Texas Gulf Sulphur affair, and
will react by saying, "[i]f that's the way they're playing it, I'll take my money elsewhere."
Even if such a reaction should seem irrational to a coldly economic man, it is not without
a certain wisdom of its own, i.e., "If there is insider trading then what else is going on
that I don't know about? Are they rigging the market? Just what can I believe?"
52 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Ist Dep't 1968),
aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
53 Professor Manne characterizes this argument as little more than foot stamping. See
H. MANNE, supra note 50, at 15 nA2. He overlooks the possibility that, if enough investors
are upset enough to stamp their feet, i.e., to say "[1It's just not right!," such a reaction,
although admittedly emotional (see note 51 supra) can nonetheless have very real economic
effects.
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odd-lot brokers) compensatory relief seems highly impractical even
if it be assumed that someone is being injured, which itself may be
a matter of considerable doubt.54 Thus, the emphasis here should be
on deterrence. In sharp contrast, where insider trading takes place in
a face-to-face context it is highly appropriate to grant compensatory
relief if the damages can be measured in some suitable fashion. Such
compensatory relief will in turn provide a form of deterrence against
further violations. All of this is merely to say that no adequate generalizations can be made to cover all the cases. The sanction should
depend on the type of trading and who, if anyone, is harmed.
Despite the infinite variations in possible fact situations, it is
still possible to formulate a general approach which would be workable in most cases. If a company's shares are listed on one of the national securities exchanges or, being dealt in over-the-counter, are held
of record by 500 or more persons and so are registered under section
12(g) of the Exchange Act (assuming that the company also meets the
requirement of having over $1,000,000 in total assets), then the appropriate remedy in most insider trading situations would seem to be
corporate recoupment of any profits realized by the violator, whether
he be insider or tippee. An appropriate statutory provision to achieve
this result might resemble section 16(b) of the existing statute except
that liability would depend on a showing that inside information was
in fact used in either a purchase or a sale (in sharp contrast to the
section 16(b) approach which requires both a purchase and a sale but
dispenses with any need to show the actual use of inside information).
Aside from these structural differences, the procedural approach
would be similar, i.e., the corporation would have the right to sue
for the profit realized by the insider or tippee and any shareholder
could bring such an action on behalf of the corporation if the latter
failed or refused to do so within a designated period after receipt of a
demand from the shareholder. As in the section 16(b) situation, such
a shareholder's suit would not be classified as derivative, despite its
being brought on behalf of the corporation, and hence it would not
54 See note 50 supra.
55 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). For favorable commentary on the possibility of corporate recovery in rule lOb-5
cases involving insider trading see 6 Loss 3574; Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The Case for Its Full
Acceptance as Federal CorporationLaw, 37 U. GIN. L. Ray. 727, 757 (1968); Knauss, Disclosure Requirements - Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 43, 57 (1968); Note,
Rule 10-5: The Effect of the Insider Trading Decisions on the Security Analyst, 54 MINN.
L. Ray. 145, 170 (1969). Professor Conant, of the University of California (Berkeley School
of Business Administration), was one of the first to suggest this approach. See Conant,
Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CoP.NEza L.Q. 53

(1960).
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be subject to local impediments such as security for costs. 56 So-called
subsequent shareholders, i.e., those who acquired their shares after
the transaction complained of, might also be allowed to sue, as is currently permitted in the section 16(b) area, and reasonable attorney's
fees could be awarded as an added inducement. 5 7 Although such
purchasing of lawsuits and its tendency to perpetuate a specialized
group of professional plaintiffs has been criticized, 5 it must be admitted that, however distasteful the scheme may be, it is also a powerful
deterrent to insider trading and other related abuses arising under
the securities laws. This is particularly so in cases involving large,
publicly held corporations whose shares are relatively widely distributed and where the vast majority of shareholders tends to be passive
if not completely lethargic. Although an occasional mutual fund or
other institutional investor might be expected to bring an action,
many, if not most funds would hesitate to do so, perhaps in the fear
that the adverse publicity might be a greater detriment to the company
and the price of the shares than the potential gain the company might
realize from recoupment of the profits from the insider. If the fund
were thoroughly disenthused with the situation it would be more likely
to dispose of its investment entirely. Thus, expediency may require
that the insider trading prohibition be enforced through what the
Supreme Court has recently characterized as "corporate therapeutics," 59 i.e., by private individuals whose real interest is in receiving
reimbursement for attorney's fees. As has been said, the scheme is distasteful, if not degrading, but it is nonetheless an effective deterrent.
A further question remains, however. Is it enough merely for
the profits to be recouped from the insider or his tippee? If the defendant receives a tax deduction for the amount he is required to pay
over, 60 he suffers no real monetary loss, being merely deprived of his
unlawful winnings. There is, of course, the unfavorable publicity
which is bound to result from litigation. Several of the individual
56 See 2 Loss 1046 n.39.
57 Id. 1051-55. For a recent holding, see Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469

(2d Cir. 1968).
58 Professor Loss has been perhaps the most outspoken critic. See 2 Loss 1053. He
suggests that the Commission might be given some enforcement powers under section 16
as an alternative solution to the problem. Id. 1053-55; see also 3 Loss 1828-29. For a
contrary opinion by an equally well-informed commentator, see Cary, Book Review, 75
HAav. L. Rav. 856, 861 (1962).
59 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
60 See Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), restricting the deduction to a short-term capital loss where the profit was originally reported as short-term
capital gain. For further discussion, see Lokken, Tax Aspects of Section 16(b) Payments, 4
GA. L. REv. 298 (1970).
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defendants in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case could no doubt confirm
the fact that the publicity may have been the most damaging feature
of the entire affair. Nonetheless, publicity can usually be avoided by
early settlement of a case. Thus, an insider might well be inclined
to take his chances. If he is caught, he can voluntarily restore his
winnings; if he is not caught, so much the better. There is always the
very real possibility that restoration of his winnings may not be the
end of the matter; he may lose his job as weil if his conduct violates
company policy. But this will depend upon the particular company
and the insider's relationship to it. If he is a controlling shareholder,
his job is likely to be fairly secure. This suggests that recoupment of
the profits may not be an adequate deterrent. It might be well then,
to explore the possibility of a treble damage clause, similar to the
approach used in the antitrust area. Such relief could be granted in
the discretion of the court, taking into account the severity of the infraction and whether the defendant's behavior indicated that such
a deterrent was advisable to prevent similar violations in the future.0 1
The treble damage approach seems far more preferable to open-ended
civil liability, which seems to be implicit in the current interpretations
of rule lOb-5, since the potential recovery far outweighs the gravity
of the offense. 62 Although no case has yet to reach an open-ended
liability result, the very possibility of such relief might lead to a
judicial hesitancy to face the issue with candor, with a further proliferation of the already complex pattern of narrow distinctions present in the lOb-5 theology. 63 This can lead only to further confusion
and uncertainty. No law, whether it involves possession of drugs or
61 Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where the
district court, after finding (on remand of the case) that the various defendants had violated rule lOb-5, exercised its discretion not to grant injunctive relief against the company
or five individual defendants since the defendants could not have anticipated the relatively
wide interpretation which the Second Circuit gave to the concept of materiality, as well
as the unlikelihood of further violations in view of the wide publicity which had been

given to the case.

62 See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity & State of Mind in
Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Ray. 423, 429 (1968). For a recent discussion, see Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: The Question of Remedy, 65 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 486,
503-05 (1970). Another commentator has suggested the possibility of punitive damages.
See Note, Securities Regulation - Damages- The Possibility of Punitive Damages as a
Remedy for a Violation of Rule lOb-5, 68 MicH. L. REv. 1608, 1622-27 (1970). But see
de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP,. 1 92,898 (10th Cir. Dec. 22,
1970), for a very recent reversal of a district court's punitive damage award in a lOb-5
action.
63 As one court has remarked, "the laws governing the securities market become more
intricate and finely spun daily. Some engaged in the business of securities trading believe
themselves to be characters from Victorian novels wandering aimlessly on treacherous
moors." H. Kook & Co. v. Scheinman, Hochstin & Trotta, Inc., 414 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir.
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the more esoteric and perhaps more socially respectable violations
involved in the securities markets, is entitled to much respect if the
potential penalty far exceeds the gravity of the offense. If the law
is not ignored it will only be selectively enforced. Such lack of predictability can hardly create a suitable environment in which qualified
people can be persuaded to become or to remain directors. The primary point should be clear enough: the emphasis should be on deterrence rather than on compensation where insider trading takes place
on the national securities exchanges or in any active over-the-counter
market. The deterrence must be both commensurate with the offense
and sufficient to prevent its occurrence. In short, it must be both
realistic and credible. Treble damages seem to meet these requirements.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then a useful approach to
that part of the insider trading problem which concerns purchases
or sales by individuals6 4 on the basis of inside information 65 in shares

of listed securities or a security registered under section 12(g) of the
Exchange Act would be to provide for corporate recovery of insider
trading profits, with treble damages to be granted in appropriate
cases at the discretion of the court. Such relief would be the exclusive
remedy for insider trading of the type described and the federal law
would in this respect preempt the field, 66 thereby preventing similar
suits in the state courts or other actions of a compensatory nature on
the federal level. The existing powers of the SEC to seek injunctive or
other appropriate relief in suitable cases67 would remain unaffected.
If this type of insider trading is subjected to special statutory provisions preempting the field and restricting the remedy to corporate
recovery, what should be done with other forms of insider trading?
The non-preempted area would consist primarily of (1) insider trading
by a corporation in its own shares, and (2) insider trading in shares of
corporations held of record by 500 or fewer individuals6 8
As far as the first category is concerned, corporate recovery of
profits is obviously ridiculous as a deterrent since the corporation by
Insiders as previously defined, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
65 See notes 41-49 and accompanying text supra.
66 See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
67 The Commission's current powers are set forth in section 21(e) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964). Texas Gulf Sulphur was an enforcement proceeding brought
under section 21(e), seeking injunctive and other appropriate relief. The Commission
should also retain administrative powers to revoke or suspend the licenses of brokerdealers for insider trading violations as well as other fraudulent or manipulative practices.
See §§ 15(b)(5) & 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5) & 78o(c)(l) (1964).
68 Or, the relatively rare case of a corporation having more than 500 shareholders
but less than $1,000,000 in assets.
64
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hypothesis has already received the profits. A more realistic approach
might be to require the corporation to disgorge its profits to shareholders with whom it dealt, i.e., to those who could show privity
with the corporation in its insider purchases or sales. If there are fewer
than 500 shareholders such a privity requirement is not likely to be a
serious obstacle since in most instances the transaction will have been
negotiated on a more or less face-to-face basis. The privity requirement, as well as reliance and such other traditional l0!b5 concepts, is
more troublesome where the shares are listed or actively traded.
Privity in the contractual sense is unsuitable as a prerequisite for recovery in such situations, due to the difficulty of tracing buy and sell
orders 9 and the windfall character of the recovery when received by
someone who did not know (or care) with whom he was dealing. The
reliance concept is open to similar objections, since only by a strained
interpretation of the term could it be adapted to insider trading on
an exchange or active over-the-counter market.7 0 Since the purchaser
or seller does not know with whom he is trading he cannot be said
to rely in any realistic sense upon the other party to disclose. And,
as already suggested, it may well be that he is not really harmed in an
economic sense. 71 Hence the concept of compensatory relief also seems
inappropriate. Accordingly, the most effective deterrent would seem
to be an action for injunctive relief which could be brought by any
shareholder (regardless of privity, reliance or a showing that he held
shares at the time of the transaction complained of)72 wherein the
court could exercise its equitable powers to order any other appropriate relief, such as the assessment of punitive damages, including
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
SPECIAL STUDY R PORT]; see also
Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566, 569 (C.D. Utah 1970), recounting
69 See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuRITIES MARKeTS,

Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 355-56 (1963) [hereinafter SEC

how counsel in one instance of attempted tracing, procured from the New York Stock
Exchange Stock Clearing Corporation sixty-nine computer print-outs, recording approx-

imately 3900 separate transactions, all involving lots of 100 or more shares, for a period
covering only four trading days. This was only the beginning of the tracing process, how-

ever, since the records of more than 225 brokerage houses would have to be examined to
determine, if possible, the identity of the actual purchasers or sellers. A final complication
was introduced by the fact that many of the transactions were by odd-lot dealers, who
represented more than one purchaser or seller in a single transaction involving 100 or
more shares.

70 Cf. Epstein v. Weiss, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,588
(E.D. La. Feb. 19, 1970). But see Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1341
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). In the past, the Commission has taken the position that the reliance
concept is inappropriate as a prerequisite to recovery in transactions on exchanges or an
active over-the-counter market. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), denying cert. to List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1965).
71 See note 50 supra.
72 See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
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a reasonable allowance for counsel fees, against any corporate officers
responsible for the trading. Such recovery might be paid into an escrow
fund, in a manner similar to that adopted by the district court in the
Texas Gulf case on remand 7 3 to be held subject to claims of interested
persons (including the SEC) and for disposition in such manner as
the court might direct. Even if the fund were eventually to revert to
the company, the main objective of deterring future violations would
have been achieved. Deterrence rather than compensation of supposedly injured parties should be the keynote in these situations, as
already pointed out.

If this approach were adopted, the final category, namely insider
trading in shares of corporations held of record by 500 or fewer individuals, would be left as a residual area in which, it is submitted, the
compensatory approach could be followed with relatively little difficulty. Transactions would tend to be face-to-face or a person would
at least be likely to know with whom he was dealing. The overall
approach could be more or less along the lines presently being followed by courts now operating under the aegis of rule lOb-5, although
the parameters of the law could be made more specific. Thus, as
already suggested, the terms insider and inside information could be
defined with greater particularity. And perhaps some effort might be
made to spell out the necessary qualifications of plaintiffs entitled to
recover. Privity in the contractual sense might be required, since this
would be relatively easy to show where the dealings were face-to-face
or on a negotiated basis. It is more doubtful whether reliance or causation should be required as well. The problem here, as in the other
areas discussed, is whether the insider trading rules should have as
their primary objective the compensation of supposedly injured victims
or whether the emphasis should be upon deterrence. It has been suggested that the latter should have the primary role and, if this is so,
then it makes less sense to insist on such tort-oriented concepts as
reliance and causation, especially if they might interfere with the
major objective, namely, deterring insider trading in any form,
whether or not others rely or are harmed in any economic sense.7 4
When May Insiders Trade?
This is the problem of the waiting period after public disclosure
of material developments during which it is supposedly unsafe for
73 312 F. Supp. at 93-94.
74 For a good argument that rule 1Ob-5 may have outlived its usefulness as a com-

pensatory device, at least in some respects, and that the tort-oriented concepts of reliance,
causation, materiality and scienter should be subjected to reevaluation, see Bahhman,
supra note 55, at 761-69.
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insiders to purchase or sell. Although the Commission attempted to
persuade the court in the Texas Gulf case to determine the length of
such a period, the court declined to do so and stated that
the permissible timing of insider transactions after disclosures of
various sorts is one of the many areas of expertise for appropriate
exercise of the SEC's rule-making power, which we hope will be
utilized in the future to provide some predictability of certainty
[sic] for the business community.7 5
The court did suggest, however, that the waiting period might be
longer "where the news is of a sort which is not readily translatable
into investment action."7 6 In other words, complex data relating to a
mineral discovery might take some time for absorption and dissemination to investors whereas a simple announcement of higher earnings
might justify a relatively short waiting period. Notwithstanding the
soundness of this approach, it would seem to be an excessively complex
task to draft a rule which would specify differing waiting periods for
differing types of information in view of the wide diversity of possible
items of disclosure. The predictability and certainty which the court in
Texas Gulf thought to be desirable as a matter of policy can be
achieved in practice only by a rule which would set forth the same
waiting period for most types of information. The waiting period
should therefore be long enough for the more complex forms of disclosure. Failure to meet the waiting period requirement would establish a prima facie case which could be overcome only by the insider
defendant's submission of enough evidence to overcome a presumption
of nondissemination. Such an approach would seem to impose little
hardship on the insider. Although insiders should be encouraged to
invest in their companies there is no such policy in favor of encouraging them to trade the shares, i.e., to try to beat the market. In the
case of unfavorable news there is a more appealing argument in favor
of permitting the insider to dispose of his investment at the earliest
possible opportunity consistent with the policy of maintaining equality of treatment for him and for the investing public. This is particularly so when we include as insiders, family members, close associates
77
and trusts to which the insider may stand in a fiduciary relationship.
75401
76 1d.

F.2d at 854 n.18.

77 For various SEC enforcement proceedings involving insider trading on the basis of
undisclosed reports of declining earnings, see SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer
92,280 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1968); In re Investors ManageBinder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
ment Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP.
77,832 (June 26, 1970);
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Investigations are
also pending by a congressional subcommittee and by the SEC into alleged selling of
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It may thus seem to be unduly harsh to require the insider to "go to
the rear of the line," so to speak, when most of the other investors are
disposing of their shares when the bad news breaks. Since most of
the situations in which this problem has been presented have involved
lower earnings reports, a matter which, as the court in the Texas
Gulf Sulphur case implied, is likely to be rapidly disseminated
and absorbed by the investing public, it might be possible to specify
a relatively short waiting period for earnings reports and a lengthier
one for all other forms of material information. This would lead
to relative certainty without undue complexity. If the insider considered that the waiting period was unrealistic he could assume the
burden of establishing that the news had been adequately disseminated
and absorbed at an earlier time, but his failure to meet the waiting
period requirement would create a presumption against him.
How long should the waiting period be? For relatively complex
matters, such as the drilling results in the Texas Gulf Sulphur affair,
the very minimum should be one day 78 and very possibly the period
should be longer. Thus, the American Stock Exchange has suggested
a period of from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after general publication of the news in a national medium. 7

9

One court has even taken the

view that twenty tradingdays should be required as a reasonable time
within which all investors could be expected to evaluate fully the
April 16, 1964 press release in the Texas Gulf situation. 80 Although
the latter seems to be extreme, it does point to the very real possibility
that twenty-four hours may not be enough. To a large degree one must
inevitably be somewhat arbitrary in these matters but it might be
well to establish a waiting period of at least twenty-four hours after
the information has been disclosed in a newspaper of national circulation (not the Dow Jones News Service but, for example, the New
York Times or Wall Street Journal). If the news relates solely to
corporate earnings, and is reported by the Dow Jones News Service,
then the waiting period might be shortened to twenty-four hours after
the report has appeared on the tape.8 ' In extraordinary situations
extensive amounts of Penn Central shares shortly before the news of sharply lower earnings became public and prior to its filing for reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 US.C. § 207 (1964). See Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1970, at 6, cols. 2-3 (Midwest ed.).
78 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. at 93; see also Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding,51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1291 (1965).
79 AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE DIscLosuRE POLICIES 16-17 (1970).
80 Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (C.D. Utah 1970).
81 It is interesting to note that in a 1966 survey by a New York public relations firm,
Burson-Marsteller Associates, roughly twice as many companies considered that corporate
news had been made public when it was delivered to a news service, such as Dow Jones,
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where a longer period is necessary for public evaluation of the news,
or where the news is itself unclear and should be particularized further, trading in the shares can always be suspended for a suitable
82
period of time.
LIABILITY FOR FALSE OR MISLEADING

PRESS

RELEASES

Rule lOb-5 has been used not only as an insider trading rule
but also as a means of insuring an adequate and accurate flow of
information to investors. In this respect, it has served as a potent supplement to the various provisions of the securities acts which expressly
require disclosure or filing.8 3 The decisions in this area can be grouped
into two general categories: (1) those which, like Texas Gulf, involve
an enforcement proceeding by the Commission based on a false or
misleading press release or other report and (2) an increasing number
of private actions for damages brought by investors who allege that
they suffered harm as a result of false or misleading press releases,
reports or corporate failure to disclose material information.8 4 Although the outlines of rule lOb-5 are particularly unclear in this area,
it appears that the developing judicial standards have been strictest
in administrative enforcement proceedings. As the Texas Gulf case
admirably illustrates, no scienter is required in such a proceeding
to establish a violation of the rule, and lack of due diligence in preparing (or failing to issue) a press release is enough to support a
cause of action. 85 Similarly, since an enforcement proceeding is brought
to protect the investing public generally it is not necessary to show
that any particular investor has relied on the allegedly misleading
press release or that economic harm has been inflicted to any appreciable extent.8 6 The essence of the cause of action is the failure to
than companies taking the more conservative view that such news had been made public
only on appearance, i.e., when the news appears on the broad tape. Certainly the latter
view is more consistent with that taken by the courts. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d at 854, holding that delivery of the news to the news services was not
sufficient to permit trading by the defendant Francis G. Coates.
82 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15(c)(5) 9- 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c)(5) &
78s(a)(4) (1964, Supp. V, 1970), dealing with the suspension of trading in over-the-counter
securities and listed securities respectively.
83 E.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) & 77q(a) (1964);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13, 15(c)(1) & 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(c)(1) & 78r (1964).
84 See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (C.D. Utah 1970); Astor v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
92,372 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1969);
Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. S c.L. REP.
92,309 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1968).
85 401 F.2d at 860-64 passim.
86 Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made . . . in a manner
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inform investors adequately whether or not particular investors have
been adversely affected.
In private actions for damages the prerequisites for a cause of
action may be more extensive, although this too is at the moment
unclear from the decisions. Several courts appear to be following the
suggestion in the various concurring and dissenting opinions in the
Texas Gulf case (particularly the views of Judge Friendly) that something more than simple negligence may be required to support a
private action for damages.8 7 Interestingly enough, the SEC's Special
Study of Securities Markets, although recognizing the difficulty of
regulating the wide area of corporate publicity, recommended that
consideration be given to the enactment of a statute providing criminal
sanctions and civil liability for
intentional or reckless dissemination by issuers or their agents, of
false and misleading statements, including forecasts unwarranted by
existing circumstances, which may reasonably be expected to affect
investment decisions, loans, or other transactions involving the
issuer's securities.88

Thus, both the decisions to date and the suggestions of the Special
Study group point in the direction of imposing civil liability only
for intentional or reckless behavior, gross negligence or at least something more than simple negligence, preserving the right of the SEC
to bring enforcement proceedings even in simple negligence cases
and without a showing of harm to particular investors.
This approach seems to be a sound one and might well form the
framework for statutory codification. The primary problem in codification would seem to relate not to making explicit the SEC's existing
enforcement powers but to spelling out the contours of a civil action
for damages. Although the concepts of gross negligence or intentional
or reckless behavior may be fairly satisfactory, difficult as they may be
to apply in occasional close cases, the more troublesome problems arise
in connection with determining who should be entitled to sue and the
extent of potential liability.
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means of the
financial media ... if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete
as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was motivated
by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.
Id. at 862 (emphasis added, indicating that all that is necessary is that the assertion have
a propensity to mislead investors); see also SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424
F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Electrogen Indus., Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
92,156 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1968).
FED. SEC. L. REP.
87 See Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cannon
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,572 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1969).
88 SEC SPECuL STuDY REPORT pt. 5, at 156.
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First, who should be able to sue for damages based on a false or
misleading press release? Although at first glance it would seem that
only those who have read or at least heard of the release, i.e., those
who may have relied, should be permitted to sue, it would seem that
other investors might be just as severely harmed by a false or misleading press release even though they were unaware of its existence.
Suppose, for example, that a company issues an unjustifiably bleak
earnings report. As a result, the price of the company's shares falls
from 50 to 40. To those who bought at 50 or sold at 40 it makes little
difference whether they read the release or not; the economic harm
they suffer is the same. The truth of the matter is that the market
has read the release and, reacting adversely, has harmed investors
irrespective of whether they knew of the release or not. There are of
course situations where reliance on a press release may create additional harm. Suppose, for example, that an investor alleges that he sold
his shares at 40 because he was disappointed by the earnings report
and that he would not otherwise have sold. If the price should later
rise to 50 after the earnings have been correctly restated the investor
has lost money which he would not otherwise have lost if he had not
read the press release and become discouraged. However, it may be
questioned whether civil recovery should be restricted to investors who
can show that their buying or selling was induced by the press release.
Other investors are equally harmed although they may have sold for
other reasons. The critical factor is that the press release has adversely
affected the market price and this would not have happened if it had
not been for the defendant's wrong. Harm to all those who sell is just
as foreseeable as harm to those who have read the release. To give a
further example, suppose that shares have been purchased on margin
and that the fall in price leads to a margin call which the investor cannot meet because of his personal financial circumstances. His account
will be sold out at the artificially low price even though he may not
have read the release which caused the market to fall. Accordingly,
unless we are to circumvent the cause of action with artificial limitations which are unrelated to the economic harm on which the action
is presumably based, the class of eligible plaintiffs should include all
investors who can show damage which is causally related to the false
or misleading press release, using cause in the broad sense of effect on
the market price.
The potential liability under this theory is of course considerable.
However, unlike the insider trading situation, where there is some
doubt as to whether investors are economically harmed by the defendant's unlawful activities, there is, in the press release situation, the
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clear possibility, if not probability, that investors will suffer economically as a result of a false or misleading release whether or not they
specifically rely on it. Even those who do not purchase or sell securities
may be harmed, although the harm is likely to be rectified once proper
disclosure has been made. Thus, civil liability should be confined to
purchasers or sellers unless the misleading situation is never clarified.
In any case, the plaintiff should be able to recover only for such loss
in value as is directly attributable to the false or misleading press release. This is on the principle that one who issues false information
should not thereby be made an insurer of any or all market declines.
The question of who is to prove causation, namely the burden
of proof in press release cases, is likely to be a decisive factor in much
of the litigation. Here, there are two possibilities. First, one could
follow the approach taken by section 11(e) of the Securities Act of 1933
and place the burden of proving lack of causation on the defendant.8 9
Secondly, one could place the burden of proving causation on the
plaintiff, as is done under sections 9(e) and 19(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.90 In view of the difficulties of proof, which may
account for the rarity of recoveries under the Exchange Act provisions, 91 one might be inclined to follow the 1933 Act format and place
the burden on the defendant. On the other hand, doing so might well
involve exposure to overwhelming liability, particularly if we permit
all purchasers or sellers (as the case may be) to sue rather than confine
suits merely to those who relied on the false or misleading press release.
At the risk of some complexity, a compromise between the two approaches is possible. Initially, the burden of proof could be placed
on the plaintiff. If the latter could show that he relied on the false or
misleading press release, i.e., that the press release was at least a significant factor in bringing about his purchase or sale, then we might shift
the burden of proving lack of causation to the defendant. In effect this
would mean that those who relied would not have to show causation;
89 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
90 Id. §§ 78i(e) 8: 78s(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
91 See 3 Loss 1747-54. Note that section 18(a), dealing with civil liability for false or
misleading statements in applications, reports or documents filed with the SEC, limits
recovery to those who relied on the statement "not knowing that such statement was false
or misleading." As Professor Loss indicates, the SEC proposed in 1941 to delete the
requirement of proving causation in view of the difficulty of proof and the Commission's
belief that, where "a plaintiff has relied upon a false or misleading statement and has
been damaged thereby . . . it is extremely unfair to require him to prove the totally
irrelevant factor that the price was affected by the statement." Id. at 1754-55, citing SEC,
REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SEcuRITIs AcT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACr OF 1934, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 88 (Comm. Print 1941). Although the Act
expressly requires reliance, is causation more relevant than reliance in this area?
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those who did not rely but were economically harmed would have to
establish that the harm resulted from the defendant's acts. Since, as
has been said, harm is likely to be suffered by both categories of investors, the compromise would be justified on purely pragmatic grounds
the risk of overwhelming and disproportionate liability,
-alleviating
rather than theoretical considerations.
It may be argued that, despite placing the burden of proof on the
plaintiff in non-reliance situations, permitting all injured investors to
sue regardless of their reliance might be unduly burdensome to those
who may be held responsible for faulty publicity even if something
more than simple negligence, e.g., gross negligence or reckless behavior
which indicates indifference to the outcome, is required. On the other
hand, there seems to be no legitimate policy reason for preventing injured persons from recovering damages merely because of their numbers. If anything, the social interest lies in assuring that acts which are
likely to entail a risk of injury to large numbers of persons are not
undertaken without at least a normal degree of care and, arguably, the
standard of diligence should be higher as the risk of injury increases.
Although an alternative approach to the problem might be to dispense
with civil liability, except perhaps in instances of wilful misconduct,
and confine relief to administrative or criminal proceedings, there
seems to be no clear policy reason for preventing injured parties from
recouping losses causally related to a defendant's conduct if the latter
is clearly in violation of a federal statute intended to protect investors
and also transcends the limits of simple negligence. No reported judicial
decision under rule lOb-5 has taken the view that civil liability should
not be imposed for gross negligence in connection with press releases.
To delimit the scope of recovery already available under rule lOb-5
because of a fear of overwhelming liability seems to be unjustified in
the absence of one or more judicial decisions which are shown to have
a manifestly unfair result. Thus, the proposed recodification, with the
possible exception of providing rights for persons who are injured and
yet who have not expressly relied on press releases, merely restates existing principles which have been developing in the case law.
LABIrY FOR B1REAcHEs OF FIDucLxY DuTy

Perhaps the most perplexing of the three major areas of rule lOb-5
jurisprudence is the extent to which the rule covers breaches of fiduciary duty. Breach of fiduciary duty is a phrase covering a multitude
of sins, but at least two types have been among the most frequently
litigated areas: (1) the extent to which a controlling shareholder should
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be held liable for selling a controlling block of shares at a premium,
and (2) the rights of a corporation which is led to sell shares to a controlling shareholder, director, officer or other insider at a grossly inadequate price, or the converse case of a purchase from any of such
persons at a grossly excessive price. Before considering the two areas
in greater detail, it might be well to point out the general direction in
which rule lOb-5 has been developing in breach of fiduciary duty situations.
The key case continues to be Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,92
an action by a minority shareholder against a controlling shareholder
for selling a controlling block of shares in Newport Steel Corporation
to one of the defendants, Wilport Steel Company, which happened to
be an end user of steel sold by Newport. As a result of the sale of control, Newport was thereafter unable to take advantage of certain
opportunities which it otherwise would have had to improve its geographical market position and to sell steel on favorable terms to customers at a time when steel was in short supply due to the Korean
War. 93 Although in a separate proceeding the sale of control was held
a breach of fiduciary duty under applicable state law, 94 the Birnbaum
case held that there was no right to recover under rule 10b-5, since the
court construed section 10(b) of the Exchange Act as being
directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities
rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and
... Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.9 5
What the court was saying, here, was that 10b-5 covers only fraud or
similar offenses "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" and that the latter phrase restricted civil liability under the rule
to those who had either purchased or sold. Although securities were
of course sold in the Birnbaum case, neither the plaintiff minority
shareholder nor the corporation on whose behalf he brought the action
had purchased or sold shares. Thus, according to the court's construction of the rule and the legislative intent of section 10(b), there was
no liability.
It is not necessary for our purposes to trace the subsequent history
of the Birnbaum rule except to observe that it continues to retain a
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
941d.
95 193 F.2d at 464.
92
93

1971]
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remarkable degree of vitality, despite fears, or hopes of those who
favor further expansion of rule lOb-5, that it had been repudiated by
some of the more liberal judicial decisions towards the close of the
1960's. 98 Although Birnbaum has been narrowed somewhat in scope9 7
it is still respectable authority with regard to private actions for damages.9 Thus, unless the action is one for injunctive or other equitable
relief, 99 it must be shown that the individual plaintiff has purchased
or sold shares or that the corporation on whose behalf he sues was a
purchaser or seller. The court's observation in Birnbaum that rule
lOb-5 does not extend to actions based primarily on mismanagement
of corporate affairs continues to be correct if this is thought to refer
to damage actions. On the other hand, if it can be shown that the
plaintiff purchased or sold shares or that the corporation on whose behalf he sues was a purchaser or seller, and that the purchase or sale
was somehow related to the transaction which gave rise to the harm 100
then there is a cause of action under lOb-5 even though there may also
be a cause of action under applicable state law. 101
The Birnbaum case is still good authority as well on the specific
question which the court dealt with, namely whether there is a cause
of action under lOb-5 for a mere sale of controlling shares at a premium. Whatever may be the result under applicable state law1 2 there
98 See Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine; A New Era for Rule 10-b5,
54 VA. L. Ray. 268 (1968).
97 One of the major exceptions is where the plaintiff sues for injunctive or other
equitable relief. Here, there are several holdings to the effect that neither the plaintiff
nor the company on whose behalf he sues need meet the purchase or sale requirement
because the action is a private enforcement proceeding. See, e.g., Britt v. The Cyril Bath
Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967); Federal Says. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 309 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Nev. 1969).
But see Berne St. Enterprises, Inc. v. American Export Isbrandtsen Co., [196 9 -1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,711 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1970). The concept that
a private enforcement proceeding need not meet the requirements of a damage action
seems to have developed by way of analogy to enforcement proceedings brought by the
SEC, such as in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
98 E.g., Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1970); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d
455 (6th Cir. 1970); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Greenstein v.
Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968); Hirsh v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Levin v. Levin Townsend Computer Corp., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,618 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1970); Bluestein v.
Friedman, [19 6 9 -19 7 0 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sa c.L. RE.
92,558 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9,
1970). Contra, Hensley v. Shell, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
99 See note 97 supra.
100 See, e.g., Bluestein v. Friedman, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. RaP.
92,558 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1970) holding that there was no lOb-5 cause of action where the
fraud occurred after the plaintiff had acquired his shares; see also Cooper v. Garza, 431
F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1970); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970).
101 See note 98 supra.
102 See, eg., Perman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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is no cause of action for damages under the rule.10 3 This is so even
if it is alleged that the seller knew or should have known that the
purchaser of control intended to loot the corporation, to waste its
assets or to mismanage its affairs. 10 4 Some exceptions to the general
rule of no recovery have been suggested where it is alleged that the
controlling shareholder invited some friends and associates to participate in the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium and did not
extend a similar invitation to all the shareholders0 5 or where it is
alleged that the purchase of control was financed in whole or in part
out of corporate funds, through a transaction whereby the corporation
was led to acquire its own shares or the shares of some other entity
at a grossly excessive price. 0 6 This latter situation, namely the bootstrap acquisition of control, illustrates how the sale of control cases
may overlap with other cases dealing with derivative suits on behalf
of a corporation which has been led to acquire shares at an excessive
price or to issue or sell them to controlling shareholders, officers, directors or other insiders for a grossly inadequate price.
There was a time when it was being argued that there would
be no liability under rule lOb-5 in the latter situation because, it was
suggested, the rule-making authority of the Commission under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act is confined to prescribing only such rules
as are "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors" and that the corporation, when it sells its shares,
or even when it purchases them, is not an investor in the usual sense
of the term. This argument was repudiated in Hooper v. Mountain
States Securities Corp., 07 and it is now well recognized that there is a
derivative cause of action for either a purchase or for a sale. 08 One
103 See, e.g., Lewis v. Salny, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. R)E'.
92,687 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. qJ92,575 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp.
1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
104 Erling v. Powell, 298 F. Supp. 1154 (D.S.D. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970).
In this situation there is a clear cause of action under most state laws. See, e.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940). For a collection of
other cases and the literature in this much written about area, see H. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CORPORA-flONs 479 n.5, 480 n.7 (2d ed. 1970). For a good recent discussion of
both the state law cases and the lOb-5 cases dealing with sale of control, see Schwartz,
The Sale of Control and the 1934 Act: New Directions for Federal Corporation Law, 15
N.Y.L.F. 674 (1969).
105Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,101 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1967). But see Erling v. Powell, 298 F. Supp. 1154 (D.S.D. 1969),
aff'd, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970).
106 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (purchasers of control may be
liable); Herpich v. Wilder, 430 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1970) (sellers of control may be liable);
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
107 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
108 E.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872
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case suggested that there may be no cause of action unless it is shown
that there is some deceit on the corporation, apparently referring to a
requirement that at least some of the directors who authorized the transaction must have been misled by others, such as their fellow directors
or the purchaser who failed to disclose material facts. 109 However,
it now seems fairly clear that a corporation may be deceived by all
of its directors in this respect and, at least where the shares are sold
to a controlling party or some other insider, there may be a cause of
action if the transaction is basically unfair and its terms are not disdosed to the minority shareholders. 110 This does not mean, however,
that all corporate sales or purchases of shares may give rise to lOb-5
liability merely because they are unfair. For example, where the shares
are sold to or purchased from an unrelated third party who is neither
an insider nor exerts any control over the board of directors, there is
no cause of action under rule lOb-5,"' although the directors may be
liable under state law principles if there has been a gross abuse of
business judgment.
It might be possible to codify this area to some extent. For example, it could be expressly provided that a prerequisite to bringing
an action for any relief other than equitable relief would be a showing
that either the plaintiff or the corporation on whose behalf he sues was
a purchaser or seller of shares. Although this might be a necessary
condition, it would not be sufficient in some cases, for, as we have seen,
it may not be enough to show merely that a corporation has purchased
or sold shares at an unfair price. It must be shown that the transaction
was with a controlling shareholder or some other interested party,
such as a director, officer or other insider.112
Since the area is obviously complex and is likely to involve a
relatively more diverse pattern of fact situations than either the insider
trading or press release liability areas, it might be well to forego
codification in the interests of permitting the courts to develop their
own guidelines. There is a definite value in what has been called the
(5th Cir. 1970); Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1969); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1964); Brummer v. Rosenberg, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,341 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1969); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Garfinkle, 292 F. Supp.
709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Nortes & Co. v. Huffines, 288 F. Supp. 855 (SD.N.Y. 1968).
109 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
11o See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp.
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Helbrunn v.
Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
111 Lewis v. Spiral Metal Co., 317 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Penn Mart Realty Co.
v. Becker, 800 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
112 Id.
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"neo-federal-common-law tradition,"" 3 particularly where it is uncertain how much of a given area the federal courts should attempt
to regulate and how much should be left for the state courts. Something can be said for a greater judicial reluctance to take cognizance
as a federal matter of actions based solely on breaches of fiduciary duty
where there is at least a considerable body of precedent available on
the state law level, unlike the situation which prevails with regard to
insider trading in shares of publicly held corporations or the problem of press release liability as it affects national securities markets.
Although some may argue that an attempt should be made to preempt the field in the breach of fiduciary duty area and even to
consider the adoption of a Federal Corporation Law under which
publicly held corporations doing a substantial amount of interstate
business might incorporate, 114 such an attempt, at least in the writer's
opinion, seems to be overly ambitious if not premature. The breach
of fiduciary duty field is simply too complex and diverse to lend itself readily to codification. It seems better to permit the further judicial development of the parameters of liability both at the state and
the federal levels on a case-by-case basis. Where it is both uncertain
what the courts should regulate and how the matter should be dealt
with it is well to let the outlines of the law develop gradually through
experience. This is the greatest contribution which can be made by the
common law.
113 Loss, supra note 30, at 34. Although Professor Loss' remarks were directed towards
a specific problem, namely the effect on corporate elections of violation of the proxy rules,
his overall approach appears to indicate concern lest overcodification in the rule lOb-5
area lead to an inadequate and artificially frozen format for future regulation of the
complexities which may develop and which may not be entirely foreseeable. He also
agrees with Judge Friendly in his assessment of the value of case-by-case development of
the law. See Friendly, supra note 2.
114 For a good discussion of the various proposals which have been made along these
lines, see I Loss 107.

